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This paper examines the impact of competition in the markets for teachers and for 
housing on the long-standing issue of the influence of school resourcing on educational 
attainment. The existence of such competition is found to imply not only downward 
bias in many earlier empirical estimates of the role of resources in the educational 
production function, but also powerful general equilibrium effects, especially for the 
impact of relative levels of school resources upon the distribution of relative levels of 
educational attainment across individual schools, that highlight the importance of how 
resources are distributed across individual schools. The paper derives optimal resource 
allocation rules for distributing government educational budgets across individual 
schools and examines the properties of the associated funding formulae. 
   1
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Raising levels of educational attainment has been a central policy goal in the UK and 
elsewhere in recent years. Towards this end, substantial additional resources have been 
devoted to the education sector, particularly for primary and secondary education (HM 
Treasury, 2004). However, a long-standing issue in the academic literature (e.g. Coleman, 
1966; Hanushek, 1986, 1997; Kreuger, 1999), with econometric and (micro- and macro-) 
economic policy implications,  is whether or not such additional resources from increased 
levels of public expenditure do result in improved levels of educational attainment in schools. 
At the same time, increased competition between individual schools has been introduced 
through ‘quasi-market’ reforms in the education sector. As noted in Le Grand and Bartlett 
(1993), Bradley et al (2000), and Bradley and Taylor (2002), such a ‘quasi-market’ in 
education is characterised by schools possessing a high degree of independence in their 
decision-making and budgetary management, and competing for the available pupils in the 
presence of publicly available information on their educational performance in examinations 
on a common national curriculum. Such ‘quasi-market’ reforms, however, tend to reinforce 
the importance for each individual school of the existence of competition in two important 
actual markets, namely the labour market for teachers and the property market for local 
housing.  In this paper we will examine the importance of competition in these two markets 
for the impact which additional resources for schools are likely to have upon levels of 
educational attainment. 
 
   2
2  THE EDUCATIONAL PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
 
For the sake of concreteness, we will assume that in the country, or region, of interest (denoted 
by Ω),  there exist  r > 1 localities, with each locality ℓ ε Ω containing an equal number n1 of 
households, and a single school, namely school ℓ to whom all households in the locality are 
required to send their children of school age.  Φℓ will denote the set of households who decide 
to locate in locality ℓ. We will assume in this paper that all households contain the same 
number, n2 , of children of school age, with n ≡ n1n2 denoting the number of children in each 
school.  The educational production function for school ℓ is assumed to be of the Cobb-
Douglas form: 
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where A is a constant, qℓ denotes school ℓ’s level of educational achievement per pupil (as 
reflected in public examination results), Tℓ its teacher-pupil ratio, Kℓ its supporting capital 
facilities per pupil, Qℓ  an index of its teacher quality,  and Yoℓ  the (geometric) mean level of  
household income in locality ℓ ε Ω. νℓ1  is assumed to be a lognormally distributed stochastic 
term (with a zero mean to lnνℓ1 ) that reflects other less directly measurable factors, such as the 
school’s ‘ethos’ (Rutter et al, 1979), that may contribute to its educational efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
   3
The positive role of teacher quality in influencing educational attainment has been stressed by 
Winkler (1975), Summers and Wolfe (1977) and Murdane (1996). The positive influence on 
educational attainment of parental income (and of variables, such as parental education, that 
tend to be positively correlated with parental income) is stressed by Haveman and Wolfe 
(1995), Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) and Lee and Barro (2001). We will also investigate 
the implications of the assumption that more resources, in the form of higher values of Tℓ  and 
Kℓ, are productive in improving the school’s level of education attainment, qℓ , with βk > 0 for 
k = 2,...,5 in (2.1).  
 
The log-linear regression equation corresponding to (2.1): 
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where β0 / lnA and uℓ1/-ln νℓ1, may be written in the form: 
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where yℓ1  / ln qℓ, yℓ2  / lnYoℓ, yℓ3  / ln Qℓ  , yℓ4  / ln Tℓ, yℓ5  / ln Kℓ, , E(uℓ1) = 0,  bk1  / βk  for k 





   4
3  COMPETITION FOR SCHOOL PLACES 
           
 
While selection by academic ability has not been a predominant feature of publicly-funded 
schools in the UK and elsewhere for several decades, an important proxy market in which 
parents can compete for the right to send their children to a particular school is that of the 
housing market. Residence in a location within what is effectively the catchment area of the 
school will typically convey a form of property right of access to the given school, in contrast 
to location elsewhere. In the decision by parents of whether or not to locate in the catchment 
area of school R, an important consideration on the demand side of the housing market will be 
the preferences of each household i with respect to examination results, school resources and 
teacher quality. Their preferences will also be dependent on the level of the local housing 
services, HR, and of other local amenities NRg  for all g = 1,...,χ that residence in locality R 
confers, as well as on the level of their private consumption, Ci, of non-housing services that 
their income, Yi, and local house prices permit. The utility level of household i if it does locate 
in locality R is assumed to be given by: 
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where HR is the level of local housing services in locality R and NR an index of local amenities, 
in which the tg  are positive constants, with γk > 0 for k = 0,...,3. The index, LR , of local school 
quality is assumed to be of the form: 
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so that parents may value not only the current level of examination success, qR , of the school, 
but also the quality of its teachers and its resourcing levels, TR  and KR , per pupil. The quality 
of local schooling that LR reflects will provide a local public good for households i ε Φℓ. Any 
other residual attractions of living in locality R that are not captured by the other measurable 
characteristics in (3.1) are assumed to be incorporated in the stochastic variable ψR >0 that is 
assumed to be independently lognormally distributed, with a mean to ln ψR  of  zero. 
 
Families are assumed to face a budget constraint of the form: 
 
 
                  Ci + p(LR, NR, ψR )HR   =   Yi                  for i ε Φℓ                                                         (3.3)  
 
 
where p is the hedonic price function (see Rosen, 1974; Freeman, 1979; Sheppard, 1999) 
which households face in the housing market per unit of annual housing services for living in 
locality R, and thereby being able to enjoy a school of quality LR, with local amenities of 
quality NR, and other attractions reflected in ψR. The endowment of housing stock in locality R 
is assumed to be fixed, with an equal number, n1, of residences and households in each 
locality, and a total number, r n1, of available residences across all localities that equals the 
total number of households, no, in the population at large. Competition in the housing market 
is assumed to bid up the price, p, per unit of housing to achieve equality with the local 
willingness to pay, P, for additional units of housing service per annum, as reflected in the 
marginal rate of substitution between housing services and private consumption, Ci, of non-
housing services given by the utility function in eqn (3.1), i.e.    6
         
                        p = P = γ2 Ci/ (γo HR )  for i ε Φℓ                                                                   (3.4) 
 
 
Substitution of (3.4) into (3.3) also implies that: 
 
 
                                  Ci = γo Yi / (γo + γ2 )                                                                             (3.5)                        
 
 
Eqns (3.1) - (3.5) generate the household bid function (Yinger, 1982), of household i’s 
maximum willingness to pay, to locate in locality R: 
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where  γ4  is a positive constant, γ5/(γo  +  γ2)/γ2 > 0, for a given maximum utility level 
obtainable elsewhere. We will assume that the total number of localities, r, is arbitrarily large 
and that the variables which define SR in (3.6) are distributed according to a multivariate 
lognormal distribution across localities R ε Ω, implying from Aitchison and Brown (1963, p. 
12) that  SR  is also lognormally distributed across localities R ε Ω.  
 
Under competition in the housing market, house prices per unit of housing stock are an 
increasing function in (3.6) of the quality of local schooling, as reflected in the index LR , as 
well as of the local amenities, NR, and other residual attractions, ψR. As in (3.2), the quality of 
local schooling may be judged not only by the examination results achieved by the local 
school but also by the quality of its teachers and the level of its resources per pupil. A 
significant positive impact of local school variables on local house prices, alongside local 
amenity characteristics and housing attributes, has been reported by several empirical studies.   7
Oates (1969) reported a significant positive association of local house prices with school 
expenditure per pupil, whilst Haurin and Brasington (1996) concluded that school examination 
success, as measured by ninth grade test score results, “is the most important cause of the 
variation in constant-quality house prices”.  In assessing the impact of  a broad range of school 
variables, Brasington (1999)  reports proficiency test scores, expenditure per pupil and the 
pupil-teacher ratio, as well as average teacher salary, to be consistently positively related to 
house prices, with teacher experience and education levels and pupil value added measures  
less significant.  In studies of UK local housing markets, Cheshire and Sheppard (1998), and 
Leech and Campos (2001),  report strongly significant impacts on house prices of dummy 
variables for being in the catchment areas of particular popular local secondary schools. A 
similar significant positive relationship between house prices in suburbs of Boston, 
Massachusetts and elementary school test scores for similar houses along the boundaries of 
school catchment areas is interpreted by Black (1999) as revealing the magnitude of parental 
willingness to pay for increased educational achievement. 
 
Parental willingness to pay in (3.6) is also an increasing function of  household income, Yi, 
which we assume to be lognormally distributed across households in the population at large. 
Competition between families in the housing market for location in area R will then result in a 
sorting of families into localities according to income. From (3.6), we have for all SR , Yi > 0: 
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The slope of the household bid function with respect to SR here increases monotonically with 
household income Yi. This implies that the indirect indifference curves that are mapped out by 
(3.6) exhibit the “single-crossing” property (see Ross and Yinger, 1999) with respect to Yi, 
that in turn yields an ordering of household types along the SR  axis, in which those households 
with the highest Yi values have the highest willingness to pay for high local community 
benefits SR . Under competition in the housing market, those with the highest willingness to pay 
succeed in securing the highest community benefits SR , and those households further down the 
distribution of income receive correspondingly lower levels of community benefits SR from 
within the available distribution of  SR across localities ℓ ε Ω. When demand is equated to 
supply in the housing market for residence in each of these different localities under the above 
assumptions, those households in the highest x per cent of the income distribution across the 
population at large will receive community benefits SR at a level which falls in the highest x 
per cent of the distribution of SR across localities ℓ ε Ω, for all 100 ≥ x > 0. When we denote 
by F the cumulative lognormal distribution function for household income Yi across   
households and by G the cumulative lognormal distribution function for SR  across localities, 
this implies: 
 
                            F(Yi) = G(SR )           for all i ε Φℓ  for all R ε Ω                                     (3.8)                        
 
 
From (3.8) we have: 
 
 
            (ln Yi   - µY )/σY = (ln SR – mS )/σS    for all i ε Φℓ  for all R ε Ω                             (3.9)                        
 
   9
where µY is the mean value of lnYi across all households and σY  is its standard deviation, with 
mS the mean value of ln SR  across all localities and σS  its standard deviation. Under our 
assumption that the number of localities, r, is arbitrarily large, the above sorting process   
according to household income will result in homogeneous communities in which all 
households in the same locality have the same income level, and hence in which:  
 
                              Yoℓ  = Yi  for  all i ε Φℓ  for all R ε Ω                                                   (3.10)                        
 
 
(3.2), (3.6), (3.9) and (3.10) imply: 
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where bk2 = (γ1ρkσY/σS) > 0 for k = 1, 3, 4, 5, b22 = -1,  cg2 = (γ3tgσY/σS) > 0, uR2 = - (σY/σS) ln 
ψR, and where ηg is the mean level of the local amenity variable NRg across all localities R ε Ω.                        
  
 
4  COMPETITION FOR TEACHERS  
 
Adequate modelling of the role of teacher quality in influencing educational attainment needs 
to be accompanied by recognition of the factors which in turn may impact upon each school’s 
teacher quality through competition in the labour market for teachers. Dolton’s (1990) 
econometric finding of the importance of non-pecuniary factors in teacher supply decisions 
has been reinforced by survey evidence (Reid and Caudwell, 1997; Menter et al, 2002) of the   10
importance of such factors for those considering entering or staying in teaching. Relevant non-
pecuniary factors may include workload, pupil behaviour, administrative burdens, and the 
availability of supporting facilities for teaching (Coulthard and Kyriacou, 2002; Smithers and 
Robinson, 2003). School examination success may also impact upon the attractions of 
teaching in any given school, with Cuckle and Broadhead (1999, p. 184) finding a positive 
link between how favourable the school inspection report was and the impact on teacher 
morale and stress reduction. Law and Glover (1999), and Ladd and Walsh (2002), argue that 
school inspection and accountability systems tend to make insufficient allowance for 
disadvantaged pupil intakes and resource levels. As a result, “schools serving higher 
performing students are more likely to be deemed effective than schools serving low-
performing students”, creating “incentives for these teachers to shun such schools in favor of 
other schools where they had a greater chance of being rewarded and a smaller chance of 
being sanctioned” (Ladd and Walsh, 2002, p. 5). In investigations into the determinants of 
teacher turnover, Smithers and Robinson (2004, 2005) similarly report teacher resignations 
from individual secondary schools to take up teaching posts elsewhere to be negatively related 
to the school’s examination performance, as well as positively related to eligibility for Free 
School Meal status, which in turn is negatively related to parental income.  
 
Schools with more favourable teacher-pupil ratios, higher levels of supporting facilities per 
pupil,  greater examination success and more advantaged family backgrounds may indeed find 
themselves with more well-qualified applicants for their available teaching posts, from whom 
they can select a higher quality of teacher. Schools with less favourable levels of these 
variables are likely instead to face staffing shortages, high teacher turnover and greater   11
reliance upon temporary supply teachers, that reduce the effective quality of their teaching 
staff. Specifically, the quality, Qℓ, of teacher staff that school ℓ is able to attract will be 
assumed to be an increasing function of qℓ,, Tℓ , Kℓ and Yoℓ, of the form: 
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where uℓ3 is a stochastic disturbance term with zero mean, and bk3 > 0 for k = 1, 2, 4, 5.  
 
 
Dalton (1990), and Dalton and van der Klaauw (1995), emphasise the importance also of 
relative earnings in teaching both for the initial decision to enter teaching and for teacher 
retention. Eqn (4.1) therefore includes the variable wℓ, to represent the wage which school ℓ 
pays to its teachers, with the quality, Qℓ , of teachers which school ℓ attracts  an increasing 
function of wℓ , and diminishing towards zero as wℓ  declines toward zero. From eqns (2.3), 
(3.11) and (4.1), we have: 
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Each school ℓ  is assumed to chooses its wℓ  and Tℓ  to maximise qℓ  in (4.2) subject to a budget 
constraint of the form:   12
 
       wℓ Tℓ  # νℓ4 ω1T Rℓ                                                                                                                                (4.3)  
 
 
where  Rℓ is the overall level of governmental funding per pupil to school ℓ, ω1T (1 > ω1T > 0) 
is the proportion of government funding which the government allocates to schools for 
expenditure on teaching, and νℓ4  is  a log-normally distributed stochastic disturbance term 
reflecting other, randomly available, sources of finance for teaching. Maximising (4.2) subject 
to (4.3) yields the following implication of the associated first order conditions: 
 
                      wℓ  = α6 /α4  for all ℓ ε Ω                                                               (4.4)                        
 
 
(4.4) implies here that the same wage rate is paid to teachers by all schools in the competitive 
labour market for teachers. However, the quality of teachers that any individual school ℓ 
attracts depends upon the additional factors in (4.1) that influence the non-pecuniary 
attractions of the school to its potential teachers.  
 
Each school is also assumed to face a budget constraint for its expenditure on supporting 
capital resources of the form: 
 
    π Kℓ  #  νℓ5ω1K Rℓ                                                                                                                                    (4.5)             
 
 
where  π is the unit price of capital facilities, ω1K  = 1 - ω1T  > 0 is the proportion of the 
government’s overall funding per pupils for schools which it allocates to support each school’s 
capital facilities, and νℓ5 is a log-normally distributed stochastic disturbance term reflecting   13
other, randomly available, sources of finance for the school’s capital facilities. From eqns 
(4.1) and (4.4), and with the yℓk defined as in equation (2.3), we have:  
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where b03   = ao - (α4 a6/α6). Similarly with (4.3) and (4.5) holding with equality, we have:  
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5  COMPETITION AND RESOURCE EFFECTIVENESS  
  
 
When we define k y′ l  as the deviation of  k yl  from its mean value k y  across all localities, for 
each k =1,..., 5, eqns (2.3), (3.11), (4.6), and (4.7) require that the associated equilibrium 
values of each k y′ l  satisfy: 
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with ln for 1,..., , ln gg g o zN g z R R R η χ ′ ′′ ≡− = ≡ ≡ − ll l l l  whereR′′ is the mean value of ln Rl 
across all localities ℓ  =1,…, r, c04 = c05 = 1, cg2 > 0 for g = 1,…, P and cgj = 0 otherwise. We 
may define  1 (/) yR ε δδ ′′ ′ ′ ≡ ll l  as the elasticity of the relative level of the educational   14
performance, 
o ql , of school l with respect to increases in its relative level 
o Rl of government 
expenditure per pupil, where these relative levels are those relative to their respective 
geometric means, q
m and R
m , of educational performance and government expenditure per 
pupil, across all schools, as in (A13). We may also define 1 (/ l n ) yR ε δδ ≡ ll l  for k = 1 in 
(A10) as the elasticity of the absolute level of the educational performance, ql, of schooll 
with respect to increases in its absolute level of government expenditure per pupil Rl. From 
(A11) and (A12), we then have: 
 
                        ε ε ′′ > ll                                                                                                            (5.2)                          
 
i.e. each school’s relative level of government expenditure per pupil exerts a more powerful 
influence upon its relative educational performance than the school’s absolute  level of 
government expenditure per pupil does on its absolute level of educational performance. 
Similar remarks apply to impact of absolute and relative levels of government expenditure per 
pupil on the other key variables  , , and o YQ T K ll l l  for school l. 
 
We can also show from (A6) and (A10) – (A11) that: 
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i.e. the proportionate impact,ε′ l , of an increase in the school’s relative level of government 
expenditure per pupil on the absolute level of the school performance ql exceeds the   15
corresponding proportionate impact of an increase in the school’s relative level of government 
expenditure per pupil on the relative level of its educational performance. This in turn falls 
short of the impact on the corresponding absolute level of its educational performance of an 
increase in the school’s absolute level of government expenditure per pupil. 
 
From (A5), (A6), (A8) and (A9), we have for k = 1,...,5: 
 




(/) w h e r e (/) 0 kk k k h h k
h
dy dR dy dR b D γϕ ϕ
=
′′ ′′ =+ ≡ < ∑                               (5.4)                        
 
 
with (/) 0 1 , 3 , 4 , 5 k dy dR for k ′′ >=from (A6) and  2 (/) 0 dy dR′′ = . Hence from (A10): 
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From (2.2), (2.3) and (5.5): 
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where  Q δ l && denotes the proportionate change  / QQ δ ll  etc and  (2.3) and (5.5) imply that all the 
β’s and all the terms in brackets in (5.6) and (5.7) are positive.   
 
In the presence of the above competitive markets for teachers and for housing, the overall 
proportional impact, εR, of additional resources per pupil for school R upon the educational   16
performance of pupils in school R therefore exceeds the proportional increase, εRo , in (5.7) of 
the educational performance of school R that is due to changes in the school’s resource inputs 
per pupil, TR and KR. The impact of the changes in these resource variables via the resource 
coefficients β4 and β5 in the educational production function will here understate the overall 





6  RESOURCE EFFECTIVENESS AND ENDOGENEITY BIAS 
 
 
(5.1) defines a set of 5 simultaneous linear equations in 5 endogenous variables and P + 1 
predetermined variables. These are related through (2.3) to the underlying school variables of 
the teacher-pupil ratio, T, the supporting capital facilities per pupil, K,   the mean level of  local 
household income, Y, and an index of teacher quality, Q, (that may itself be derived from 
teacher qualifications and a measure of teacher turnover). In addition, they include the level of  
government funding per pupil, R, and the P amenity variables that make up the local amenity 
index, N, in (3.1).  The disturbance terms uRj in (5.1) are assumed to be independently 
normally distributed with zero means and variances of Fj
2, and to be contemporaneously 
uncorrelated with each other.  
 
We can now investigate the implications of applying OLS estimation to the first of these 
equations, namely the educational production function associated with (2.1)-(2.3), using the 
variables T, K, Y, Q, and R as regressors for the dependent variable of school examination   17
performance, q. Given the set of simultaneous equations (5.1), the degree of asymptotic bias in 
the estimate of each regressor’s coefficient βk of the endogenous variables k = 2,...,5 
associated with (5.1) may be shown, using Mayston (2005), to equal: 
 





() / ( 1 ( / ) ) 0
oo
kj k j k j j j j
jj




=− + ≡ + > ∑∑                         (6.1) 
  
           
22 2
22 2 2 2 2 03 , 4 , 5 , 0 , v a r ( l n ) ( 1 ) 0
oo
jj RN vf o r j v N σσ κ κ ζ ′′ ′′ ≡> = ≡+> ≡ − ≥                 (6.2)           
 
 
with the asymptotic bias in the OLS estimate of the regression coefficient of the 
predetermined variable ln R given by: 
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where RN ζ  in (6.2) is the correlation coefficient between ln and ln R N ll  across schools R ε Ω.    
         
We can now determine the implications of our above analysis of competitive markets for 
teachers and for housing for the degree of asymptotic bias in the estimated coefficients of the 
resource variables in the educational production function under OLS. From (2.3), (3.11), (4.6), 
and (4.7), we have: 
 
  b1j > 0 for j = 2,3, b1j = 0 for j = 4,5; bkj > 0 & βk > 0 for k = 4,5 & j = 2,3;b44 = b55 =  -1  (6.4)                 
 
 
implying from (6.1) and (6.2) that:  
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The OLS asymptotic estimates of the proportionate impact of a school’s resource variables TR 
and KR on its educational performance will therefore understate the true coefficients of these 
resource variables in the educational production function. (6.3), (6.4) and (5.1) also imply 
downward asymptotic bias in the estimated coefficient on government funding per pupil, RR , 
whenever there is a positive correlation between government expenditure per pupil on a school 
and the level of local amenities. Such a positive correlation may indeed prevail if there is a 
high level of reliance of government funding for each school upon local taxation. From (5.7) 
and (6.5), we have: 
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(A11), (5.3), (5.4) and (6.6) imply: 
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From (A9)-(A12), (5.3), (5.5)-(5.7) and (6.6), each respective proportional impact 
,,, a n d
o
oo ε εεε ε ′′ ′ llll l  has the same value for all schools R ε Ω. The regression-based estimate 
o
o εl  in (6.6) is the proportional impact on the absolute level of each school R’s educational 
achievements of a proportional increase in the absolute level of government funding per pupil 
for the school operating calculated using the asymptotic OLS estimates  45 and
oo β β of the 
resource coefficients of the educational production function. It falls short in (6.6) and (6.7) of 
the value of its impact,  o εl , based upon the true coefficients  45 and β β of the educational   19
production function. This in turn is smaller than the overall proportional impact,εl , of a 
proportional increase in the absolute level of government expenditure per pupil for the school 
on the school’s absolute level of educational achievements in (5.6) and (5.7), when due 
account is taken of the impact of additional funding upon the attractiveness of the school in the 
competitive markets for teachers and local housing. εl  itself falls short of the proportionate 
impact,ε′′ l , on the school’s relative educational achievements of a proportional increase in the 
school’s relative level of government expenditure per pupil. The impact, ε′ l , of a proportional 
increase in the school’s relative level of government expenditure per pupil upon the school’s 
absolute level of educational attainment is even greater thanε′′ l  in (6.7). Small, and even 
negative, values to 45 and
oo β β in OLS regression studies, as in many of the empirical studies 
reviewed by Hanushek (1986, 1997), are then consistent with potentially large positive values 
to , and ε εε ′′ ′ ll l  in (6.7). 
 
(5.5) also implies that for alldln Rl: 
 
 
                    11 1
1
(/ l n ) ( l n / ) ( ( / ) )
r
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                                          (6.8)                        
 
             
Hence from (A9), (A13), (A4) and (A6) for all r >1: 
 
 
               11 1 1 1 0( / ) ( / )
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for all( / )
m dR dR l && && . ε in (6.9) indicates the overall proportional impact on the (geometric) mean 
level of educational achievement across all localities in the given country or region Ω, of a 
proportional increase in the (geometric) mean level of government funding per pupil. The 
RHS of (6.10) is the sum of the proportional impacts on each individual school R’s absolute 
level of educational achievements in (6.10) of the proportional increases in each school R’s 
absolute level of level of government funding per pupil that are associated with a proportional 
increase in the mean level R
m of government funding per pupil. While it remains positive, the 
overall impact, ε, in (6.9) across the given country or region Ω as a whole will be less than the 
sum of the individual impacts on each school R’s educational achievements of additional 
government funding in (6.10) for school R. In contrast to the analysis of Hanushek, Rivkin and 
Taylor (1996) of the effect of aggregation on omitted variables bias, a higher level of 
aggregation of examination performance above school level, such as at US State- or English 
LEA-level, will here tend to understate the influence of additional resources for an individual 
school upon the educational performance of the individual school. 
 
In the presence of competitive markets for teachers and housing, additional government 
funding per pupil for any given individual school R exerts a form of negative externality on the 
relative competitive position of all other schools t ≠R, in the labour market for attracting higher 
quality teachers, and in the housing market for attracting more well-endowed parents. From 
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so that additional government funding per pupil for school R, holding constant that of other 
schools, will in equilibrium reduce the absolute level of each other school τ ’s educational 
performance,  as well as reducing the quality of teachers that other schools attract and the 
average income level of those parents who decide to locate in these other localities.  
 
7  POLICY OPTIMISATION 
 
 
There are a number of policy implications of the above analysis of the impact of competition: 
 
a. additional resources will have a positive effect in raising educational attainment, and an 
effect that is greater than the estimates produced by earlier empirical studies that have relied 
on OLS estimation of the educational production function; 
 
b. the impact of additional resources on the overall level of educational attainment of the 
country or region will, however, be less than that associated with the direct effect of additional 
resources on each individual school’s level of educational attainment;  
 
c. changes in the relative levels of government expenditure for individual schools exert an 
even more powerful influence on the school’s educational attainment than do changes in their 
absolute levels, so that how resources are allocated across individual schools is of particular 
policy significance.  
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It is therefore of interest to examine optimal second-best policies for allocating resources to 
individual schools in the presence of the above competitive market constraints. One 
formulation of the objective function for such a policy is that of maximisation of a welfare 
function, W, that incorporates a constant coefficient,  0 ς ≥ , of relative aversion to inequality 
(Atkinson, 1970) in the distribution of educational performance. In addition, we will assume 
that there is imposed an overall budget constraint that total government expenditure across all 
schools does not exceed the available total schools budget of RT.  We will specifically assume 
that the educational resource allocation policy seeks to maximise: 
 
                         
1
11
/(1 ) subject to
rr







≡− ≤ ∑∑                                                (7.1)                         
 
 
for 1 ς ≠ ,  with ln 1 Wq f o r τ
τ
ς ≡= ∑ ,  and subject to the market-related constraints given by 
(2.3), (3.11), (4.6) and (4.7). Rather than express the second-best policy optimisation (7.1) 
subject to these constraints in the Lipsey-Lancaster (1956) form of involving numerous 
additional Lagrangean multipliers, we may instead make use of the solution to these equations, 
as in (5.5) and (6.11), for the overall impact of changes in government funding per pupil for 
individual schools on school examination results, together with the first-order conditions for 
each school R εΩ: 
 











= ∑ l                                                             (7.2)                        
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where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the aggregate budget constraint in (7.1). 
Equations (A9), (5.4), (5.5), (6.10), (7.1) and (7.2) imply that the optimal budget share for 
each school R ε Ω equals: 
 
*1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 (/ ) (/ ( ( 1 ) ) w h e r e / ( ) 0 , / ( ) 0 To o sn R R q W r
ς φφ ς φϕ γϕ φγγϕ
− ≡= +− ≡ + < ≡ + > ll l  (7.3)                         
 
 
so that the government educational budget share of each school R ε Ω in (7.3), if set optimally, 
would increase linearly with the proportionate extent to which the school’s educational 
performance contributes to the overall welfare function W, after taking into account the 
policy-maker’s inequality aversion coefficient ς .  From (7.3), we have for each school R ε Ω: 
 
        / 0 1, / 0 1, / 0 1 s q for s q for s q for ς ςς ∂∂ > <∂∂ = =∂∂ < > ll ll ll                           (7.4) 
 
so that each school’s optimal share of the government educational budget is an increasing, 
decreasing or constant function of its examination performance, according to whether the 
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so that the optimal school budget shares are all equal to 1/r if ς equals one, but otherwise a 
school’s optimal budget share will exceed, equal or fall short of 1/r depending upon whether 
its level of educational attainment exceeds, equals or falls short of the overall mean level q
o of   24
the educational attainment, after adjustment by the coefficient of inequality aversion. If the 
policy-maker’s concern for inequality is sufficiently great that ς > 1,  (7.5) implies that those 
schools with relatively low levels of educational attainment will be allocated a greater share of 
the government educational budget than those with higher levels of attainment. However, if ς 
< 1, a greater policy emphasis is placed upon boosting the overall mean level of educational 
performance, with (7.5) implying that those schools that have shown themselves capable of 
relatively high levels of educational attainment are allocated a greater share of the government 
educational budget under the optimal resource allocation rule given by (7.3). 
 
Under the optimal resource allocation formula, the proportional impact on the government’s 
welfare function, W, of a unit proportionate increase in its schools budget, RT, will equal: 
 
                          11 (/) ( / )( / ) 0 WT TT dW dR R W R W ε λγ ϕ ε ≡= = + = >                                  (7.6) 
 
using (5.4) – (5.6), (6.9)-(6.10) and (7.1)–(7.3). The magnitude of the external competitive 
effects that reduce the value of ε  below the weighted sum in (6.10) of the direct effects on 
individual schools of additional resources will itself depend upon a number of features of 
educational policy that influence the magnitude of the relevant coefficients in equations (2.3), 
(3.11), (4.6) and (4.7). These features include the extent to which: i. individual teachers’ 
careers are enhanced by being associated with schools with high levels of educational 
attainment in absolute terms, rather than with schools that may have high levels of value 
added, after allowing for educational disadvantage and low levels of pupil prior attainment; ii. 
entry to schools is dependent upon residence in local residential catchment areas, rather than   25
upon selection from a wider spectrum of socio-economic locations in the way suggested by the 
‘banding’ proposals in DfES (2005, p.47) for achieving ‘an all-ability intake’;  iii. there is 
selection by parental interview or other proxies that ensure that schools with higher initial 
levels of educational attainment succeed in recruiting pupils from more advantaged 
backgrounds;  iv. schools are under strong pressure to appear high in national league tables of 
examination results; and v. schools have greater freedom to determine their own admissions 
policy, as suggested in DfES (2005, pp. 46 – 7). Each of these factors will influence the extent 
to which competition in the housing market, and in the labour market for teachers, will lead to 
positive feedback effects where initially advantaged schools secure greater cumulative 
advantages that further boost their levels of educational attainment, albeit with negative 
external effects on the relative competitive position of other schools in these markets. 
 
 
8  CONCLUSION 
 
 
The introduction of competition, for teachers and for school places, into the analysis of the 
impact of resources on educational outcomes highlights the powerful influence which 
resources can have on the distribution of educational outcomes, once a more extensive general 
equilibrium approach is introduced into the analysis than the earlier concentration upon the 
educational production function allows. Resource allocation policies, and associated funding 
formulae, may then be derived which optimise the distribution of educational resources across 
schools for any given degree of aversion to inequality in educational attainment, in the 
presence of the cumulative effects on educational attainment which such competition entails. 
   26
APPENDIX 
(5.1) may be written in the form: 
 
     YB = - ZC + U where  [ ], [ ], [ ], [ ], [ ] kk j gg j j YyB b ZzCc Uu ′ ≡ ≡≡≡≡ ll l               (A1) 
 
Differentiation of (2.3), (4.6) and (4.7) implies: 
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We will assume that B is a Hicksian stable matrix, with principal minors that alternate in sign. 
Hence so too are  B11, Bo and Bo11. Since in (2.3), (3.11) and (4.6) we have bkj > 0 for k≠j and 
bkk= -1 < 0 for all k, j = 1, 2, 3, we may write B11 = M – I and Bo11 = Mo – I, where M and Mo 
are indecomposable non-negative matrices with zero diagonal elements, and I is an identity 
matrix. It follows from Quirk and Saposnik (1968, pp. 210-11) that all the elements of the 
inverses 
1
11 [] kj B D
− ≡  
1
11 for k, j 1, 2,3and [ ]for k, j 1,3
o
ok j BD
− =≡ =  are negative. Since, from 
(2.3), (3.11), (4.6), (4.7), (A3) and (A4), all the elements of Bo21 and B21 are positive, this in   27
turn implies from (A5) that for k = 4, 5: 0 for 1,3and 0
o
kj kj Dj D < =< for j = 1,2,3, 
kj = ,
o
kj kj DD δ −= − the Kronecker delta, for j = 4, 5. Hence from (A2) and (A5): 
                        45 / ( ) 0 for 1,3,4,5
oo
kk k dy dR D D k ′′ =− + > =                                                  (A6)                         
 
Eqns (2.3), (3.11), (4.6), (4.7)  and (5.1) imply for each ℓε Ω: 
 
 
                 [ ] [0,0,0, , ] for 1,...,5 k dy B dR dR k ′′ ′ =− − = ll l                                                           (A7) 
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with  2 0 dy = , since  2 Y y µ = =constant. (A5) and (A7) imply, holding all other h R′ constant:  
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(A5), (A6), (A8) – (A9) imply, holding all other h R  constant, that: 
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